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Sharing, Subsistence, and Social Norms 
in Northern Siberia
John P. Ziker
The majority of families in Ust’-Avam in northern Siberia are dependent on subsistence hunt-ing, fishing, and trapping and have been part of a vertically integrated industrial economy 
in a remote area of the former Soviet Union. Thus, the results from behavioral games conducted 
there in 2003—the dictator game (DG), the ultimatum game (UG), and the third-party punish-
ment game (TPG)—lend themselves to comparison with other indigenous hunter-gatherers, as 
well as with working communities in other nation-states.
My ethnographic research in the region beginning in 1992 helps to contextualize these 
results. The two indigenous ethnic minorities in the community (Dolgan and Nganasan) have dif-
fering linguistic, religious, and economic histories, and I took these differences into account in 
my analysis of the game results. Group characteristics did not result in different outcomes in the 
experiments, although individual and household characteristics did. The results show moderate 
levels of second-party punishment in the ultimatum game, along with relatively high offers and 
a notable concern for fairness in the dictator game.
The chapter begins with a summary of the ethnographic material relevant to this commu-
nity of indigenous hunter-fisher-trappers in northern Siberia. Next, results of player surveys and 
a descriptive analysis of the game results are presented. The chapter closes with a presentation 
and discussion of the multiple regressions of the game results.
SubSiStence and Sharing in uSt’-avam
This section presents empirical data on resource use and distribution at the Ust’-Avam research 
site, as well as ethnographic facts about the population, ethnic groups and languages, and reli-
gions. These facts embody relevant information about the community’s institutions and social 
norms, which historically were based on kinship, reciprocity, and reputational mechanisms. 
Its resource base and property institutions shifted with economic intensification and shifts in 
settlement patterns during the Soviet period. However, traditional limits on production and 
prosocial sharing norms remained a defining characteristic of the indigenous communities in the 
Taimyr region throughout this time. The recent economic history of this remote community in 
the postsocialist context shows an increased reliance on subsistence and sharing. In particular, a 
study of contemporary food-sharing practices in the community highlights observed prosocial 
behavior and references to the norms for sharing summed up in a number of local aphorisms 
Chapter 13
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or heuristics. These material and ideological contexts help to explain why certain independent 
variables affect the game results reported in the following section.
Location
This research was conducted within the political boundaries of the Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenetskii) 
Autonomous Region, Russian Federation (see figure 13.1). The region was officially subsumed 
under the larger Krasnoyarsk Krai as a municipal district, beginning January 1, 2007, as part of 
a suite of similar consolidations occurring across Siberia in the last few years.
Ust’-Avam, an indigenous Siberian community of 550 people, is situated at latitude 71°07′ 
north and longitude 92°49′ east on the Taimyr Peninsula, the northernmost extension of the 
Eurasian landmass. Ust’-Avam is approximately 250 kilometers by air from the regional capital, 
Dudinka, and 400 kilometers by water from the industrial city of Noril’sk. Ust’-Avam is one of two 
native communities in closest proximity to that city. Noril’sk is located adjacent to the northwest-
ern foothills of the Putoran Mountains, which form the northern boundary of the central Siberian 
plateau. Modern indigenous settlements such as Ust’-Avam—named for the confluence (ust’) of 
the Avam and Dudypta Rivers—have developed largely in lowland taiga-tundra transition areas and 
along rivers that cut across the peninsula to the north of the Putorans.
Source: Ziker (2003), reproduced with permission.
Taimyr Autonomous Region
Russian Federation
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Arctic Circle
FIGURE 13.1  Location of Ust’-Avam, Taimyr Autonomous Region, Russian Federation
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ethnic groups and Languages
The indigenous population of Taimyr includes five ethnic groups: the formerly titular Dolgan 
and Nenets, along with Enets, Nganasan, and Evenk.1 The Dolgan is a métis population known to 
descend from Yakut, Tungus (Evenk), Russian, and Samoyedic ancestors. The Nenets, Enets, and 
Nganasan are considered to be descended from Iron Age immigrants to the region (Klobystin 
2006) and related through their Samoyedic languages. Evenks, one of the most widespread 
indigenous populations in Siberia (Tungus language family), generally live in taiga zones and 
are known for small communities and small domestic reindeer herds. Russian industrial expan-
sion and mass immigration to the region began in the 1940s with the development of Noril’sk 
Alpine Metallurgical Combine; the population of newcomers now numbers over 150,000.2 
The indigenous population has come be less than 10 percent of the entire population since the 
amalgamation with Krasnoyarsk in 2007.
The study community, Ust’-Avam, is approximately 50 percent Dolgan, 45 percent Nganasan, 
and 5 percent other nationalities from the former Soviet Union. The distinction between Dolgan 
and Nganasan has been blurring in recent decades, as there have been many mixed marriages 
between these groups and between members of these groups and non-indigenous individuals 
(Ziker 2002a). Since elementary education was made mandatory in the 1950s, most everyone in 
the community speaks Russian. The elders in an ethnic group commonly use the native language 
(Dolgan or Nganasan) among themselves. Between elders of different ethnic groups, Russian is 
used. When elders speak to middle-aged or young people, they often use the native language, 
but the younger people tend to respond in Russian. Young people learn their native language in 
school as a second language, and the use of Russian is almost universal for people forty years old 
and younger.
The Dolgan language is similar to Sakha (Yakut), the northernmost branch of the Turkic 
language family.3 Nganasan is one of six languages in the Samoyedic branch of the Uralic language 
family (Dolgikh 1962).4 The total Dolgan population is approximately 5,500 people in the Taimyr 
region. The Nganasan population is much smaller at approximately 766 people.
Social Structure and demographics
Until the mid-1970s, Dolgan families traditionally practiced reindeer pastoralism, mostly in 
combination with terrestrial game hunting, fishing, trapping, and mercantile trading in extended 
family groups (Popov 1937, 1964), and later in Soviet-era work collectives. A minority of 
Dolgan families utilized dog teams for travel instead of domestic reindeer. Mobility was critical 
for subsistence production and trapping of fur-bearers. Despite the harsh climatic conditions 
and their focus on hunting, fishing, and trapping, at the beginning of the Soviet era in the 1920s 
census-takers had identified a small proportion of Dolgan families who owned domestic rein-
deer herds running into the thousands of head as being rich. To keep track of these animals these 
families often hired young people from poorer families or distant relatives and paid them with 
food, supplies, and a small number of reindeer. Some of these families had strong reputations 
in mercantile trade and would travel hundreds of kilometers from Lake Essei to Volochanka and 
Dudinka. Soviet authorities viewed such families as exploiters, and many were disenfranchised 
from the political process when nomadic and clan soviets were established. Most of the Dolgan 
population lived at that time with smaller reindeer herds used for seasonal subsistence migra-
tions and for checking trap lines (Ziker 2012).
The Nganasan were traditionally known for their wild-reindeer hunting and use of small 
herds of domestic reindeer for decoys. At the time of the advent of Soviet power, the Nganasan 
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lived in extended family units and had seven exogamous patrilineal clans. Bilateral cross-cousin 
marriages occurred into the 1940s and 1950s. Shamanism was a strong tradition among the 
Nganasan, and a few individuals had reputations for being powerful shamans. The shamans’ 
reputation for antisocial behavior is still discussed (for example, a shaman used a human girl’s 
skin on a drum) as the reason for the extinction of that lineage of shamans.
According to 2002 statistics, approximately 80 percent of the native population in Taimyr 
lived in rural locations such as Ust’-Avam (Goskomstat RF 2002). Today, after eighty years of 
Soviet and post-Soviet development, the Dolgan live primarily in remote villages, from which 
they procure areas to hunt, fish, and trap. In Khatangskii District at the far eastern frontier of the 
Taimyr Region, three predominantly Dolgan communities practice reindeer pastoralism along-
side hunting, fishing, and trapping. The majority of Nganasan today live alongside the Dolgan in 
three permanent settlements; one of these communities is Ust’-Avam.
The construction of modern villages in the 1960s and 1970s increased the total population 
living in one location, and the kinship relationships that had existed when people lived in families 
and bands and worked in earlier forms of Soviet enterprises, or in families and bands before 
Sovietization, became less dense. In addition, some populations were moved significant distances 
to join people with whom they had previously had few direct relationships. Such politically 
imposed changes probably put pressure on social norms as the number of contacts with unfamiliar 
and unrelated individuals increased. In modern Soviet villages, medical care, schools, stores, and 
the community centers and offices of the vertically integrated hunting-fishing enterprise provided 
a complex institutional framework, largely managed from the outside. Concomitantly, the 1970s 
saw a shift in mortality patterns from one of high infant and childhood mortality to one of low 
infant mortality but increased adult mortality (Krupnik 1987; Ziker 2002a), following the patterns 
of the demographic transition. In many ways, the Dolgan and Nganasan lived under conditions that 
paralleled life in northern indigenous communities in North America.
religion
The Dolgan accepted Russian Orthodoxy in the nineteenth century. Dolgan shamans coexisted 
with Dolgan Christianity until the mid to late 1930s, when purges under Joseph Stalin resulted 
in the arrest and execution of shamans across Siberia. Nevertheless, animistic beliefs and taboos 
of various sorts exist to the present day. Dolgan informants often claim Russian Orthodoxy as 
their religion, and although there are no churches in the immediate area, symbols of Orthodox 
Christianity, such as icons, are displayed in some houses.
The Nganasan did not adopt Christianity during the Russian colonial period (Popov 1963, 
1966). The Nganasan modified their settlement pattern to live largely north of the tree line, thus 
avoiding Russians and the ancestors of the Dolgan population who migrated from the south. 
This more northerly strategy facilitated minimal involvement with the Russian state. Nganasan 
shamans were active in the 1970s, but all of the elder Nganasan shamans are now deceased, 
and few, if any, Nganasan have the knowledge to conduct a traditional suite of shamanic rituals. 
However, some Nganasan religious rituals, such as paying homage to the family protector spirit, 
are still practiced.
economic history
Native people in Taimyr began the twentieth century as sovereign tribute-paying nationalities 
within the Russian empire. Then, beginning in the 1930s, extended families and native bands in 
the Avam tundra became increasingly drawn into economic development under Soviet ministries. 
13521-13_CH13_4thPgs.indd   340 1/2/14   1:12 PM
 Sharing, Subsistence, and Social Norms in Northern Siberia 341
As a result of Stalin’s collectivization campaign, eventually most domestic reindeer herds were 
collectivized and turned over to a growing cadre of professional managers, veterinarians, and 
distribution networks. Simultaneously, cultural stations were set up at traditional trading and 
gathering locations along major rivers. Cultural stations manned by Soviet activists grew over 
the years to include schools, medical services, and stores. These locations also housed the offices 
of early Soviet work groups (artel’) and collective farms (kolkhoz).
More than eighty kolkhozes were developed in the region, but these were amalgamated in 
the 1950s and 1960s into seventeen larger, more sedentary, and more ethnically diverse state 
companies (sovkhoz). By the 1970s, most native adults worked as salaried hunters, fishers and 
trappers, craft producers, and laborers within state companies, as well as in administrative and 
educational staff positions. Thus, the concepts and experience of working in a salaried organiza-
tion, receiving bonuses, and purchasing goods have a reasonably long history in Taimyr.
In 1971 the government hunting enterprise GPKh Taimyrskii was established in the Avam 
tundra and along the Piasino River. GPKh Taimyrskii was one of four such enterprises in the 
Soviet Union—large units administered directly by the Ministry of Hunting. GPKh Taimyrskii 
had four subdivisions, three of which were predominantly staffed with non-natives. In 1993 the 
Ust’-Avam subdivision had fifty-five local indigenous men distributed in twenty-one assigned 
hunting territories (ugod’ia). GPKh Taimyrskii annually procured more than 50,000 caribou in 
the late 1980s. In the state economy, the production of meat from wild and domestic reindeer, 
freshwater fish, and the pelts of fur-bearers reached all-time highs during Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
Perestroika period (1987 to 1991).
The GPKh Taimyrskii hunting and fishing brigades in Ust’-Avam each had annual plans for 
the production of white and red fish, reindeer, Arctic fox, and other fur-bearers. Staff hunt-
ers were paid, and they had the opportunity to receive prizes and additional cash for surplus 
production. By the 1980s, there were no domestic reindeer left in the organization, and the 
focus had shifted to the procurement of wild resources. The standard of living in communities 
like Ust’-Avam was high by Soviet standards, and residents had access to trade goods that were 
difficult to obtain in Soviet cities. The people of Ust’-Avam were well integrated into the cash-
based planned economy.
Major economic changes occurred after 1993. Sovkhozes and the GPKh Taimyrskii were 
stripped of most of their functions other than basic municipal services for remote communities. 
Dolgan and Nganasan hunters no longer received salaries, and the production of game, fish, and 
fur began to fall. Women, many of whom worked in the GPKh Taimyrskii sewing shop, were 
reclassified as hunters in 2000, meaning that they, too, would no longer be salaried workers. 
Currently, a small number of community members are employed as teachers and civil servants, 
and many people receive social security pensions and environmental degradation compensation 
from Noril’sk Nickel, the mining and metallurgy company in Noril’sk.
The people of Ust’-Avam now have a mixed-subsistence economy in which hunting, fishing, 
and trapping predominate over commercial food production and exchange. In my ethnographic 
study among the Dolgan and Nganasan during the 1990s (Ziker 2002a), I found that the local 
subsistence economy had become increasingly important after the collapse of the Soviet planned 
economy and that other consequences of the economic upheaval were an increase in the incidence 
of violent death and reduced overall fertility (Ziker 2009).
natural resources and Property
Today the Dolgan and Nganasan in Ust’-Avam continue to hunt wild reindeer, fish, and trap, and 
they still consume these foods at almost every meal (Ziker 2002b). As a result of Soviet development 
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of their economy, the loss of domestic reindeer, and their settlement in large villages, they now 
largely rely on combustion-powered transportation (snowmobiles and outboard motors) for 
much of their subsistence activity. However, depending on a family’s wealth, the time of year, 
and fuel supplies, a portion of hunting, fishing, and trapping activity occurs on foot (Ziker 2007).
Alongside the economic depression and emergent subsistence economy in the post-Soviet 
period, presidential decrees, federal laws, and regional edicts have favored a variety of forms of 
property intended to protect the traditional economic activities of the indigenous population. 
A mix of formal landholdings and informally managed common-pool territories has been utilized.
Surrounding the village of Ust’-Avam itself, a common-pool hunting and fishing territory 
(liubitel’skaia ugod’ia) became more important as hunters and other workers were laid off and 
more distant hunting territories were not supplied by the GPKh Taimyrskii. Common-pool 
territory effectively expanded after the cessation of large-scale caribou hunts on water in 1993.
“Family-clan” holdings and similar types of collective property, otherwise known as “communes” 
(obshchina), were carved out of former state-farm lands to aid the indigenous people in protecting 
their economic traditions (Ziker 2003).5 The Avam tundra had only one registered family-clan hold-
ing at the time of this research. The holding was rarely used because of its distance from the village.
The land surrounding the common-pool territory of Ust’-Avam, previously assigned to 
hunting and fishing brigades during the Soviet Union, continued to be used by those individuals 
who were members of those brigades or their relatives. These lands were mainly used for subsis-
tence hunting and fishing, with the surplus distributed within the community and exchanged for 
fuel and spare parts. Extremely distant territories, more than 150 kilometers from the village 
and those not located on major waterways, fell into disuse in the 1990s.
The Dolgan and Nganasan manage their common-pool resources with a variety of context-
specific norms that include and exclude specific people in particular forays at particular spots 
(tochki). I documented such informal means of regulating property in the bush, particularly 
during goose-hunting season and the on-water caribou hunt, and I also documented ways of 
regulating access to and multiple rights for resources in the community (Ziker 2002a, 2003; see 
Anderson 2000).
contemporary Food-Sharing
The collapse of rural food production in Russia after 1991 increased dependence on subsistence 
production across a wide range of the population. Dolgan and Nganasan widely share in the dis-
tribution of meat, fish, and fur—goods necessary to survival in this region. Women and elders 
are prominent actors in the distribution and preparation of game, fish, and fowl. Empirical data 
on the inputs, outputs, and conditions of hunting, along with data on food distributions, relative 
quantities, relationships of receivers to givers, and hunters’ rationale for sharing, showed a num-
ber of significant social and ecological effects (Ziker 2007).
First, distributions of food procured while hunting on foot were largely oriented to provi-
sioning kin, through the rationale of “hosting” and “returning aid.” A minority of distributions 
went to those who asked. Second, hunts that utilized mechanical transportation had more par-
ticipants, the distributions were broader, and the rationales for hunting included more requests 
and trades; in addition, significantly more food was distributed in recognition of participation in the 
hunt. In mechanized hunts, procurement events represent more cooperation (by-product mutu-
alism, tit-for-tat reciprocity, or exchange) in the production and distribution process. Overall, 
production volume and parameters affect distribution patterns and rationales: when production 
levels increase and hunting partners are included, more food goes to nonkin; when production lev-
els are limited, the bulk of food goes to kin, particularly close kin. Third, informal social networks 
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are the main conduits by which local food is locally distributed (Ziker 2002a; Ziker and Schnegg 
2005), providing another venue for collective-action coordination. Focal follow-up surveys and 
rank-order interviews of households in the community indicated that the average household’s 
food-sharing network included ten to fifteen other households.
The local cultural logic of sharing appears to encourage altruistic giving through heuristics 
(Ziker 2006) that reflect salient evolutionary pressures (kin selection, reciprocity, ancestral 
value on cooperation). Finally, close kin are differentially “gifted” food, while more distant kin, 
friends, acquaintances, and others tend either to help on the hunt or to ask for food. This indi-
cates that the most altruistic giving is more common with kin, while reciprocal altruism and 
tolerated scrounging are more common with more distant social relations.
implications for the economic experiments
The hardships of the postsocialist economy, the use of common-pool territories and nonmarket 
food-sharing, the demographic profile of the community, and the study community’s continuing 
but limited contact with markets held a number of implications for the behavioral experiments.
First, food-sharing is in large part a manifestation of the larger kinship estate that maintains 
active use of hunting spots and territories. Kinship, both genealogical and affinal, is the most com-
monly mentioned vector for food transfer. One might expect that a kinship variable, such as the 
number of descendants in the community, could have an effect on decisions in the experiments.
Beyond kin, there is an expectation in the community that those with food (the “haves”) will 
give it to those who are unable to produce food (the “have-nots,” including the elderly, single 
mothers, and those who are not good at hunting). This expectation is expressed in local social 
norms. If individuals who are relatively well off carry such ideas into the experimental games, 
one might expect a positive correlation between generosity and economic indicators.
Similarly, as production levels increase and surpluses can be exchanged for fuel, spare parts, 
hunting supplies, and consumer goods—necessary for months-long hunting seasons in the tundra—
one finds greater dependence on actors in the regional market (middlemen). Such people have vari-
ous reputations in the community for dealing unfairly (often) or fairly (rarely). A concern for fairness 
would be expected among those who have greater experience with the market.
Third, because of the different religious and ethnic backgrounds of the two major indigenous 
ethnic groups in the community, one might expect some differences in the game results. These 
expectations are discussed after the description of the methods and the results of the experiment.
methodS
Here I first describe the details of the experiment that were particular to this research setting. 
Then I provide some descriptive information on the independent variables, including income, 
wealth, and religion, that were derived from the questionnaire associated with the experimental 
protocol. The section closes with a description of the results of decisions in the games.
My research in Ust’-Avam began in January 1994 and ran intermittently for a total of 
twenty months through March 2003. I spent an additional eighteen months in the regional 
capital and three other small communities in the Taimyr region, beginning in 1992. The trust 
and rapport I built up with the community over this period helped both to achieve consensus 
in performing the experiments and to guarantee that participants believed that their decisions 
were real and they would be paid.
The ultimatum game and dictator game experiments were administered in Ust’-Avam 
during a January–March 2003 research visit supported by the Max Planck Institute for Social 
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Anthropology. The experiments followed the protocols provided by Joseph Henrich (chapter 3). 
I conducted the experiments in Russian—the community lingua franca. Three rooms in the vil-
lage school were used, and fi ve research assistants monitored subjects and read protocols (see 
photo 13.1). The show-up fee of 100 rubles (U.S.$3.10) was approximately equal to an average 
daily income. The stake for each game was also set at 100 rubles.
The village administration supplied what is called a “social passport” for the community, 
which was a list that included individual and household information. There were 163 households 
listed on the document. (Fifteen households located in an outlying community 180 kilometers 
by river away from Ust’-Avam were not included.) Of the individuals living in Ust’-Avam, 
I chose every third adult and did not pick more than two individuals from one household. One 
ethnic Russian refused to participate in the experiment. One individual could not understand 
the instructions during individual testing and had to be excused after fi lling out a player data 
sheet (and being given the show-up fee). One passerby was added to the subject pool prior to 
initiation of the games because of a no-show. With these exceptions, the sample is a random 
selection of the adults in households across the community. Fifty-nine individuals played both 
games—thirty playing the role of player 1 and twenty-nine playing the role of player 2.6
independent variables
Player data sheets were used to generate independent variables on the players. There were 
thirty-two female and twenty-eight male participants, age eighteen to seventy-nine. As men-
tioned, one participant, a seventy-one-year-old female, dropped out of the experiments after 
Source: Author’s photograph.
Note: Research assistant Natasha Chuprina reads a game protocol in Ust’-Avam, 2003.
PHOTO 13.1  Reading a Game Protocol
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she failed to understand the test questions. The average age of participants was 38.72, with a 
standard deviation of 12.75 years. The skewness and kurtosis figures were low, and a histogram 
of age closely follows a normal curve.
Education, in years, was reported for fifty-eight of the sixty participants. The mean educa-
tion was 9.60 years, with a standard deviation of 2.36 years. The distribution is not skewed, but 
thirty-three individuals reported the mode (ten years of education), and the variable’s kurtosis 
is abnormal. Square root and natural log transforms of years of education also show a lot of 
variation on normal probability (Q-Q) plots.
There were twenty-eight Nganasan and thirty-two Dolgan participants. Ethnicity was 
described in the social passport under “national’nost’” (Dolgan, Nganasan, Nenets, and so on) 
and coded as a dummy variable (Nganasan and non-Nganasan). Because of the correspondence 
between ethnicity and religion (all pagans are Nganasan, as described below), the two variables 
were not used in regression models at the same time.
Household size ranged from one to eight individuals and averaged 4.68 individuals, with 
a standard deviation of 2.11. The distribution is relatively flat across the sample. Nevertheless, 
the normal Q-Q plot shows observed values very close to those expected, and so the variable is 
useful for multiple regressions. The mean number of children was 2.25, with a standard devia-
tion of 2.25. Households did not necessarily include all of an individual’s offspring, however, 
as older children tended to get their own apartment. The distribution of the total number of 
offspring is skewed right among Ust’-Avam participants because eighteen of sixty individuals 
had no children. Further, there is a strong correlation between age and number of descendants 
in the data set, so controlling for age is important when considering the number of offspring. 
Only one of these variables is used at a time in further analysis since there is a strong relationship 
between household size and number of offspring.
There were two questions regarding religion on the player data sheets. The first question 
was an open-ended inquiry on religious affiliation. The second had to do with the frequency of 
religious attendance. Sixteen respondents—all Nganasan, and approximately one-quarter of the 
pool—classified their religion as “pagan” (iazychnik) or “Nganasan.” Twenty-four respondents 
said that they were Russian Orthodox, including two Nganasan. There was one expressed athe-
ist. The remainder left the question blank (ten Nganasan and nine Dolgan). I set up three dummy 
variables to represent the positive listing of religion: pagan, Christian, and either religion. The 
fact that approximately one-third of the sample was equivocal about religion (or was an expressed 
atheist) probably reflects the influence of Soviet economic development and political activism, 
which repressed indigenous Siberian religions in the early nineteenth century.
Twelve of sixty participants filling out data sheets reported religious attendance greater than 
zero times per week. Since only three of these participants ended up being assigned the role of 
player 1, using the religious attendance variable entails the loss of many cases for looking at game 
results. However, religious attendance indicates a strong commitment to social norms and may 
be of interest. In addition, attendance at religious services is not related to being pagan (Pearson 
chi-squared 0.341, p = 0.559), but it is related to being Christian (Pearson chi-squared 4.444, p = 
0.035), even though there are no churches in the vicinity. This is because two individuals indicated 
that they attended church more than once a day, and they were both Christian. It is possible that 
they conducted religious rituals in their homes, as Orthodox icons are found in some homes.
Income showed great variance. Annual incomes ranged from 0 to 171,000 rubles 
(U.S.$5,516). The annual mean income was 38,964 rubles (U.S.$1,256) for all participants in 
the study. These figures include individuals with jobs in the village, individuals receiving pensions 
and other social payments, and the unemployed. The standard deviation was 39,617 rubles. The 
distribution is skewed right because of six individuals making over 100,000 rubles per year and 
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30 percent of the sample making less than 10,000 rubles (U.S.$310) per annum. Six claimed 
to have no annual income at all. Although these are missing data, it is unlikely that they would 
change anything significantly, as these informants were unemployed and probably received only 
minimal social compensation from the state (that is, in the 10,000-ruble-per-year range). The 
log transform drops six cases because their income was zero. Both the log and square root trans-
forms are very close to expected values according to normal probability (Q-Q) plots. The square 
root of income is preferred because it is less skewed and does not drop the zeros.
To understand the average purchasing power of the average income, consider that in 
March 2003 a one-way helicopter flight from Ust’-Avam to Dudinka cost the equivalent of 
U.S.$90.65—a figure close to the average month’s income. Regular travel to and from the 
regional capital was not possible for many villagers. A loaf of bread—sold under state-supported 
prices—cost 20 rubles, or approximately 63 cents, at the village bakery. Many people made 
their own bread, however, and a kilogram of high-quality unbleached flour was relatively costly 
at 30 rubles, which is approximately what bulk flour costs today in U.S. supermarkets.
Participants were asked to list items that could be considered capital wealth, including 
snowmobiles, sleighs, boats and boat motors, firearms, sewing machines, bank accounts, and 
other items of capital wealth. Since many of these items were purchased either before the 1991 
collapse of the Soviet economy or during the period of rapid inflation during the 1990s, depre-
ciation was not figured. Rather, the wealth variable is simply a cumulative count of items listed. 
The range of answers was zero to seven, with a mean of 1.7 and a standard deviation of 2.02. 
Skewness and kurtosis figures for wealth are less than one, and a normal Q-Q plot of wealth 
shows observed values close to expected values.
descriptive Statistics on the game results
The mean offer in the dictator game in Ust’-Avam was 37.3 percent of the stake, but the modal 
offer (twelve offers) was 50 percent of the stake (figure 13.2). The Dolgan and Nganasan had the 
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FIGURE 13.2   Distribution of Offers in the Dictator Game and the Ultimatum Game in  
Ust’-Avam, 2003
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highest proportion of fifty-fifty offers across all study communities (see chapter 4). The mean offer 
was midway along the distribution of study communities. The second and third most frequent 
offers in the DG were 10 percent (five offers) and 40 percent (four offers). The distribution of these 
data suggests that concern for fairness was strongly internalized for the majority (53 percent) of 
participants. Attempts to maximize income (by offering 0 or 10 percent of the stake) were found 
for a small minority (20 percent). By far the majority of respondents were fairer than they had to 
be in the DG, considering the random and blind assignment of their decision.
The most frequent ultimatum game offers in Ust’-Avam (made by close to 60 percent of 
player 1s) were 50 percent of the stake; average offers were slightly lower (48 percent). To have 
mean offers hovering around 40 percent in the UG with the mode at the fifty-fifty split is char-
acteristic of studies of university students and Western societies (Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van de 
Kuilen 2004; see also chapter 2). Mean and modal offers in Ust’-Avam were in the middle of the 
range of findings by Joseph Henrich and his colleagues (2004). There were two hyper-fair offers 
in both games, totaling 7 percent of offers.
In general, the UG results show a heightened tendency to make the modal offer in comparison 
to the DG, as should be expected under the knowledge of potential second-party punishment. In 
addition, in the UG there was a significant reduction in the frequency of offers at 10 percent or 
below. Hyper-fair offers occurred at the same low frequency in the UG and DG. The correlation 
between DG offers and UG offers in Ust’-Avam was 0.320, with a statistically suggestive p-value 
of 0.084 (two-tailed). The weak correlation between game results appears to be related to the shift 
of player offers to the modal offer with the knowledge of the potential for offers to be rejected.
Surprisingly, the Dolgan and Nganasan were moderately accepting of low offers on aver-
age in these experiments. An examination of the distribution of rejection rates (figure 13.3) 
shows that approximately 52 percent of respondents rejected offers of 0 percent. With offers of 
between 10 and 40 percent, player 2s were increasingly accepting. At offers of 50 percent, there 
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was universal acceptance. One informant rejected all hyper-fair offers. As mentioned earlier, 
two hyper-fair offers occurred once in the UG and once in the DG.
The average minimum acceptable offer (MinAO) for the Ust’-Avam experiments was 
14.8 percent of the stake (with twenty-nine player 2s). For comparison, the average MinAO for 
experiments at Boise State University in 2005 (Ziker et al. 2006) was 25.5 percent (eleven player 
2s). Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler (1986, S291) report an average MinAO 
of 25.9 percent in experiments with psychology students at the University of British Columbia.
Running over the player 2 rejection pattern in figure 13.3 is the projected income for each 
player 1 offer. The income-maximizing offer (IMO) for player 1s would be 10 rubles, consider-
ing the rejection pattern. It is possible that a number of player 1s had a sense that a 10 percent 
offer was acceptable for a significant number of community members (represented by player 2s 
in the UG) based on their own thinking about making such a decision. The risk of being rejected 
dropped 18 percent from offers of zero to offers of 10 rubles, and the potential payoff was 
relatively great. The next best offer was 50 rubles in the UG, with no rejections and thus a sure 
chance of receiving the 50 rubles.
regreSSion reSuLtS
What variables are related to these patterns? In this section, I present the results of multiple regres-
sion analysis of the DG, UG, and MinAO (dependent variables) in order to explore the indepen-
dent variables related to patterns seen in the game results. In each case, I begin with the standard 
set of variables used in the project. I then change the sets of independent variables to focus on those 
that are the best predictors of the pattern within this community. Finally, I summarize the results 
of the regression analyses and suggest why some variables are good predictors of the dependent 
variable and others are not.
Table 13.1 shows the linear regression results for four different combinations of indepen-
dent variables in predictions of DG offers. Model 1 is the standard set of variables as indicated 
in the guidelines for this book (see chapters 3 and 4). The variables age, sex, years of education, 
and wealth-divided-by-household-size were not related to DG offers. Individual income was the 
only significant variable. For each standard-deviation increase in income, DG offers increased 
almost 17 percent.
Model 2 leaves only income from the previous model and adds wealth, household size, 
and number of examples. This combination of variables significantly increases the adjusted 
R-squared of the model and results in high model significance. A standard-deviation increase in 
wealth results in a 7.5 percent decrease in DG offers. Similarly, a standard-deviation increase in 
household size decreases DG offers by 6.7 percent. This is probably why the combined variable 
showed no relationship to offers. On the other hand, increasing the number of examples read in 
the experiment resulted in a 6.5 percent increases in offers.
Model 3 replaces wealth with attendance at religious services. The goodness of fit remains 
the same (adjusted R-square = 0.413) at high model significance, but the constant itself falls 
out of the range of significance. A standard-deviation change in attendance at religious services 
increases DG offers by 15 percent in model 3.
In model 4, both wealth and attendance at religious services are included. With t-statistics 
at +/−1.5, both variables have coefficient significances of p = 0.135 in model 4. Although this is 
far from standard levels of acceptable significance, these variables show some potential for being 
related to DG offers when each is considered separately, as shown in models 2 and 3. Model 4 
explains the most variance (R-squared = 0.560), but adding the wealth and attendance at reli-
gious services variables at the same time dilutes their specificity.
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In table 13.1, the income variable shown is the square root of income, following recom-
mendations for normalizing the distribution (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). If, instead, actual 
income figures are used, in model 1 the constant is significant at the < 0.10 level, and in mod-
els 2 to 4 the constant is significant at the < 0.01 level. In addition, the variable coefficient for 
income is lower at 12 to 13 (standardized errors of approximately 3) with much stronger sig-
nificance (0.000 in most models). Also, the standardized coefficient for wealth (approximately 
10 percent) is significant at the < 0.05 level in models 2 and 3, and the coefficient for attendance 
at religious services (15 percent) is significant at the < 0.10 level in model 4. Real income seems 
to be more comparable to the other continuous variables and may provide a better goodness of 
fit (adjusted R-squared = 0.539 in model 2).
Overall, the statistical analysis indicates that DG offers are most strongly predicted by 
individual income, household size, the number of examples given in the one-on-one sessions, 
and marginally by wealth and attendance at religious services. This is true for either income vari-
able (actual income or its square root). Other variables, including age, sex, ethnicity (dummy), 
religion (pagan, Christian, all-religions dummies), years of education, wealth-divided-by-house-
hold-size, and number of offspring, show no indication of a relationship with DG offers when 
added individually to a regression on income and number of examples.
DG offers are increased by individual income, number of examples read, and attendance at 
religious services. Participants who had greater disposable income may have made higher offers 
TABLE 13.1    Linear Regressions of Ust’-Avam Dictator Game Offers
Variable (Divided by  
Standard Deviation) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age −0.186
(3. 949)
Female −5.181
(7.906)
Education −2.511
(4.540)
Individual income 16.788** 16.424*** 17.272*** 17.856***
(6.401) (5.110) (5.183) (5.029)
Wealth/household size −5.334
(4.305)
Wealth −7.534* −6.813
(4.494) (4.373)
Household size −6.736* −6.774* −6.537*
(3.849) (3.848) (3.727)
Attendance at religious services 15.446* 13.969
(9.211) (8.963)
Number of examples 6.576* 6.828* 6.379*
(3.546) (3.535) (3.433)
Constant 37.121 25.127* 17.863 21.776*
(23.489) (12.679) (10.336) (12.656)
Observations 29 29 29 29
Model significance 0.133* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004***
Adjusted R-squared 0.139 0.413 0.413 0.450
Source: Author’s calculations based on author data.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients are standardized by (divided by) the standard deviation.
***Coefficient significant at < 0.01 level in two-tailed test
**Coefficient significant at < 0.05 level in two-tailed test
*Coefficient significant at =/< 0.10 level in two-tailed test
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because they felt a stronger compunction to follow social norms for fairness. Participants who 
had been given more examples took longer to understand the math. It is possible that they also 
did not identify with selfish motives, or that they were not as experienced in making monetary 
decisions and so went with what seemed like more equitable decisions. Religious attendance 
also may indicate an interest in social norms of fairness and greater egalitarianism in decisions. 
Household size and wealth decreased offers. With larger households, competition over household 
resources could train individuals to be more selfish overall. Similarly, it takes more selfishness to 
amass and maintain wealth items in small-scale communities such as Ust’-Avam.
Table 13.2 shows the linear regression results for three different combinations of inde-
pendent variables in predictions of UG offers. Model 1 is the standard set of variables for this 
project. The variables age, sex, years of education, individual income, and wealth-divided-by-
household-size were not related to UG offers. Model 1 had a negative and insignificant ability 
to predict variation in UG offers.
Model 2 includes variables that were successful in explaining DG offers: household size and 
number of examples. Wealth was also added, as were attendance at religious services, ethnicity, 
religious dummies, and number of offspring. None of these variables had any success in predict-
ing UG offers.
Model 3 drops all unsuccessful variables and includes the offer made in the first game (the DG 
offer). A standard-deviation increase in DG offer was related to a one-quarter-percent increase 
in UG offer at the < 0.10 level of statistical significance. The model has a positive goodness of 
TABLE 13.2    Linear Regressions of Ust’-Avam Ultimatum Game Offers
Variable (Divided by 
Standard Deviation) (1) (2) (3)
Age 1.353
(3.678)
Female −0.943
(7.364)
Education −1.699
(4.229)
Individual income 1.563 2.077
(5.962) (4.906)
Wealth/household size −1.085
(4.010)
Household size −2.279
(3.335)
Number of examples −3.051
(3.611)
DG Offer 0.249*
(0.139)
Constant 45.684** 51.106*** 33.686***
(21.879) (12.726) (5.935)
Observations 29 29 29
Model significance 0.984 0.680 0.084*
Adjusted R-squared −0.184 −0.054 0.071
Source: Author’s calculations based on author data.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients are standardized by (divided by) the standard deviation.
***Coefficient significant at < 0.01 level in two-tailed test
**Coefficient significant at < 0.05 level in two-tailed test
*Coefficient significant at =/< 0.10 level in two-tailed test
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fit. Along with the constant, model 3 explains about 10 percent of the variance in UG offers 
(R-squared = 0.103) at the < 0.10 level.
That no independent social or economic variables explained UG results indicates the strong 
pressure to make fair offers in light of the possibility of second-party punishment. Similar results 
were found when using real income instead of square root of income.
Table 13.3 shows the linear regression results for four different combinations of independent 
variables in predictions of minimum acceptable offers in the UG. Model 1 is the standard set of 
variables for this project. Importantly, data on MinAOs provide a way to analyze the decisions of 
those who participated as player 2 and to understand the willingness of the population to employ 
costly punishment to enforce social norms. The variables in model 1—age, sex, years of education, 
individual income, and wealth-divided-by-household-size—show no relationship with MinAOs.
Model 2 retains age, which was the variable that had the strongest t-statistic in model 1, 
and adds wealth, the ethnicity dummy variable, and the Christian dummy variable. Again, the 
adjusted R-squared (goodness of fit) is negative, and there is no statistical significance to the 
model. The result is similar when ethnicity, pagan, and religion dummy variables are considered 
separately in this model.
Model 3 again retains age, but drops other variables that previously showed no relationship 
to MinAOs. Model 3 adds the household size variable and the number of examples in the UG. 
TABLE 13.3    Linear Regressions of Ust’-Avam Minimum Acceptable Offers
Variable (Divided by 
Standard Deviation) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age −4.950 −3.687 −4.134
(4.877) (4.465) (3.832)
Female 8.291
(10.369)
Education −4.552
(4.931)
Individual income −1.386
(7.517)
Wealth/household size −0.926
(3.909)
Wealth −2.809
(3.683)
Household size −6.613* −6.954*
(3.487) (3.483)
Ethnicity (dummy) 1.127
(9.550)
Christian (dummy) −1.198
(9.217)
Number of examples 6.888** 6.607*
(3.243) (3.243)
Constant 46.397* 29.413* 28.351* 17.044
(26.641) (14.558) (14.833) (10.529)
Observations 30 30 30 30
Model significance 0.861 0.825 0.067* 0.047**
Adjusted R-squared −0.131 −0.098 0.155 0.149
Source: Author’s calculations based on author data.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients are standardized by (divided by) the standard deviation.
**Coefficient significant at < 0.05 level in two-tailed test
*Coefficient significant at =/< 0.10 level in two-tailed test
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Other combinations are also attempted in place of age, including number of examples in the DG, 
attendance at religious services, ethnicity dummy, religion dummies, and number of offspring. 
No combination of variables provides any better goodness of fit or model significance. Model 3 
has statistical significance and explains 24.5 percent of the variation (R-squared = 0.245) in 
MinAOs with a positive goodness of fit (adjusted R-squared = 0.155).
Model 4 drops age and retains number of examples and household size. Both independent 
variables retain t-statistics at or above −2 and statistical significances just over the </= 0.05 level, 
but the model’s constant drops out of statistical significance. Model 4 has the highest statistical 
significance overall and has goodness of fit close to that of model 3. Model 4 explains 21 per-
cent of the variation (R-squared = 0.210), but it may be somewhat underspecified (adjusted 
R-squared = 0.149). No other independent variable could be found to help predict MinAOs.
Household size is negatively related to MinAOs in models 3 and 4. A standard-deviation 
increase in household size results in 6 to 7 percent decreases in minimum acceptable offers. 
Individuals in larger households may have been willing to accept lower offers because, living in 
such households, they were likely to be sharing a collective pie with a larger number of people 
on a daily basis and were thus accustomed to accepting smaller portions. Significantly, the effect 
of household size on DG offers is also reflected in MinAOs: increasing household size reduces 
DG offers and MinAOs. In models 3 and 4, a standard-deviation increase in the number of 
examples increases MinAOs by almost 7 percent. Similar to the effect of number of examples 
on DG offers, this effect may reflect some participants’ lack of mathematical ability or the fact 
of being less mathematically inclined, which might have made them tend to be more careful and 
to search for the “right” (more egalitarian) decision.
The overall rejection rate in the Ust’-Avam experiments is somewhat lower than the 23.7 per-
cent rate found among the Hadza (Marlowe 2004) and lower than the rejection rates found in 
experiments among university college students (Roth et al. 1991) and other Western populations 
among whom there was a 22.5 percent average rejection rate in six sessions (Abbink et al. 1999). 
The Ust’-Avam rejection rate is significantly higher than that found among the Kazakh, Quichua, 
Ache, and Tsimane', among whom rejection rates were less than 5 percent (Henrich et al. 2004). 
The rejection patterns among the Dolgan and Nganasan were close to those of the Hadza (chapter 
6, available at: http://www.russellsage.org/Ensminger) and in the middle of the distribution of 
societies included in this project. The independent variables that explain the variance in rejection 
rates in Ust’-Avam are household size and number of examples read in the experimental session. 
These results suggest that the widespread practice of sharing within the community is reflected 
in both the relatively low average minimum acceptable offer and the effect of household size on 
MinAO. The social norm of food-sharing is reflected not only in the number of local concepts and 
aphorisms on the subject but also in the regular distributions to relatives, friends, and those who 
needed food that researchers consistently observed across the community.
concLuSionS
What were the expectations for the games in light of the contextual information for Ust’-Avam 
provided at the outset? The first expectation was that kinship, as documented in interviews and 
repeated visits, would be confirmed as an important vector of resource and food-sharing in the 
community. If kinship assumptions carried over to the games, then one might expect individuals 
with more offspring to be more generous. A better measure might have been number of rela-
tives in the community, but that information was not included on the player data sheet, since the 
definition of “relative” is difficult to standardize across cultures. Using my genealogies and census 
information for the community, I counted the number of living siblings, aunts and uncles, and 
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first cousins for every player. Linear regression of these kin counts on DG offers, UG offers, and 
MinAOs were uncorrelated.
I also investigated the effect of the presence of a living father, mother, or spouse on UG 
offers, DG offers, and MinAOs, using independent sample t-tests. Two of nine t-tests show sig-
nificant differences. First, the difference in mean UG offer of players with living versus nonliving 
spouses (a mean of 40 for those with a living spouse versus a mean of 60 for those without a 
living spouse) is significant (t = 2.162, p = 0.042). Second, the mean MinAO of players with a 
living versus nonliving father (a mean of 18 for those without a living father and a mean of 3.333 
for those with a living father) is significant (t = 2.634, p = 0.022). Having a living spouse lowers 
the mean UG offer, and having a living father lowers the mean MinAO. In both cases, the effect 
is a result of a few individuals with neither a living spouse nor a living father playing in a more 
generous fashion. While suggestive, the overall effect of kin on game play is not robust, which 
may be a result of the anonymous and uncontextualized nature of these experiments.
Furthermore, in regression analyses of data from the player data sheets, the players’ number 
of offspring and their age were not related to player 1 offers in either the dictator game or the ulti-
matum game or with player 2 minimum acceptable offers in the ultimatum game. The number of 
individuals living together (household size) was shown to be a negative factor on offers in the DG 
and with MinAOs. This result may indicate greater levels of competition over resources in larger 
households. Overall, the kin effects on game behavior in this set of experiments are minimal.
Source: Author’s photograph.
Note: Ust’-Avam, 2003.
PHOTO 13.2   Game Participants and Research Assistant Listening to the DG Protocol After Filling 
Out Player Data Sheets
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A second expectation about sharing in the community is that those with resources (the 
“haves”) would make transfers to those who do not have resources (the “have-nots,” including 
the elderly, single mothers, and those who are not good at hunting), as documented in many 
food-sharing studies. Carrying this idea into the games, one might expect a positive correlation 
between generosity and economic indicators, such as wealth. In fact, the opposite was demon-
strated. Wealth indicators are negatively related to DG offers. It is likely that maintaining wealth 
items in the community indicates a history of not lending them out, and thus greater concern 
for self. On the other hand, disposable income is positively related to higher offers in the DG, 
as predicted.
Considering the hardships of the postsocialist economy, one might expect increased selfish-
ness over limited resources during the transition to a free market. In fact, a frenzy of property 
acquisitions occurred in central regions of Russia in the 1990s, and the privatization of industry 
was notoriously corrupt. In the Ust’-Avam community, by contrast, common-pool territorial 
strategies and nonmarket food-sharing developed to deal with the vagaries of cash payments 
and the supply of consumer goods. The demographic profile of the community indicates much 
stress on adults (high mortality rates due largely to binge-drinking), illustrating limited but 
influential contact with markets—the source of alcohol and other consumer goods. Only a few 
individual incomes were greater than two standard deviations above the average income, and 
many individuals received less than the mean because their only source of income was social 
welfare. A concern for fairness might be expected among those who had greater contact with 
outside bureaucracy and institutions—such as teachers and other civil service workers—and 
among those who were better able to make purchases in the market. In addition, I observed that 
people in Ust’-Avam who had money pooled money with relatives to purchase wealth items, 
such as new rifles. Similarly, very successful hunters and fishermen in Ust’-Avam were regularly 
traded surplus with middlemen to acquire fuel and supplies. They were very concerned with 
the fairness of trades and often discussed unfair traders. In fact, regression analysis indicates that 
standard-deviation increases in income are strongly related to increased DG offers, but unrelated 
to UG offers and MinAOs. In the UG, it is likely that potential costly punishment drowned out 
the income effect on fairness.
Third, one might expect some differences in the game results attributable to the different 
religious and ethnic backgrounds of the two major indigenous ethnic groups in the community. 
Interestingly, there were no differences by ethnic group or religion, although frequency of atten-
dance at religious services (indicated by twelve of sixty participants) was marginally related to 
increased DG offers.
Generosity is encouraged among the Dolgan and Nganasan through kinship, food-sharing, 
and common-property traditions, including maxims, aphorisms, and cosmological ideas that 
reward giving and emphasize negative outcomes of selfishness. It appears that these norms of 
sharing manifest in the pattern of DG offers in Ust’-Avam. In the UG, there were moderate 
numbers of low offers and moderate levels of punishment, which may reflect the social norms 
surrounding reciprocal sharing and by-product cooperation in collective procurement events. 
There was a small level of risk-taking in the community, as exhibited by a low incidence of 
low UG offers and a complementary moderate level of willingness to punish egoists. Player 2s 
expressed a willingness to accept what was given in the postgame interviews. The influence of 
individual income on DG offers also probably reflects individual experiences with exchanges 
in the larger economy. All of these results are consistent with Ust’-Avam’s subsistence hunting-
and-gathering lifestyle, common-pool resources, and expectation that all community members 
are entitled to aid.
13521-13_CH13_4thPgs.indd   354 1/2/14   1:12 PM
 Sharing, Subsistence, and Social Norms in Northern Siberia 355
This research would not have been possible without the goodwill and cooperation of the people of 
Ust’-Avam. Many thanks go to the game participants, some of whom are pictured in photo 13.2. 
Funding for this research was provided by the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. This 
chapter is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation (grants BCS 0136761 
and OPP 0631970). I thank Joe Henrich, Jean Ensminger, and Will Palmer for comments on the 
manuscript.
noteS
1. All five groups are considered “small-numbering Northern peoples” (malochislennye narody Severa), following 
Soviet ethnicity policy for thirty such ethnicities. Larger-numbering native groups, such as Sakha, Tuvan, and Buriat, 
have greater political autonomy within Russia and the states referred to as “republics.”
2. Histories of Siberia (for example, Forsyth 1992) document the presence of Russian trappers, Cossacks, and 
Orthodox missionaries in the region since the mid-1600s. Russian immigrants were few in number, however, 
and the colonial relationship stipulated a degree of autonomy to native peoples (inorodetsy, or “Russian people of 
another faith”), reflected in the ordination of native kings and administrative tribes.
3. There is local debate as to the distinctiveness of the Dolgan language, with some arguing that it is a dialect of Yakut. 
In fact, there is a Western dialect of Dolgan (farther from Yakutia) and an Eastern style that is more similar to Yakut. 
I have documented many word substitutions in the Western dialect. For example, in the West they say “tyali,” or 
language of the tundra people, but in the East they say “hakhali,”the language of the Hakha people. Ust’-Avam is 
within the tyali-speaking population.
4. Nganasan is an endangered language, with fewer than one thousand speakers. The Nganasan were earlier known 
as the Tavgi Samoyed and Vadei Samoyed (Popov 1966), reflecting a similar distinction between Western and 
Eastern language communities. Nganasan is really a misnomer begun by Soviet ethnographers—it means “man.” In 
Nganasan, they call themselves Nya (people).
5. Archival research (Ziker 2002a) showed that most of the 140 land allotments made from 1992 to 1997 (48 by 
indigenous people) were located in close proximity to the regional capital (Dudinka), along the Yenesei River or in 
proximity to Noril’sk.
6. Two player 1s were matched with the same player 2 for the purposes of figuring the final payoff in the UG. This final 
pair was matched at random.
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